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Introduction and summary
Efficient financial markets facilitate the smooth trans-
fer of money from those who save to those with prof-
itable investment opportunities. Such markets generally
exhibit high levels of trading volume and widespread
market participation. Investors are willing to partici-
pate because they are convinced that the prices at which
securities can be bought and sold are reasonably effi-
cient. For example, a market participant should be able
to buy or sell a share of stock in XYZ company at a
price very close to the present discounted value of
the market’s best estimate of XYZ’s future dividend
payments.1
So where do these market estimates come from?
There are two main types of information underlying
these estimates—one, information that is common to
all market participants (I call this public information),
and two, information that is specific to individual in-
vestors (I call this private information). An example
of public information in this context would be a news
release about company XYZ that might be expected
to move the company’s share price. A company mak-
ing a surprisingly good earnings announcement typi-
cally sees an immediate rise in its stock price. Bad
news generally has the reverse effect. Clearly, this
type of information impacts market prices.
What is less clear is whether and to what extent
private information impacts stock prices. On most
trading days, there is no obvious “news” (that is, public
information) regarding the value of a particular stock,
yet stocks still trade and often show noticeable price
changes. Some widely held stocks trade every few
seconds on all trading days. Although some of this
activity can be linked to public news, much of the trad-
ing and related price changes occur when there is no
easily observable event or publicly conveyed infor-
mation believed to be relevant to a given company’s
stock price. Suppose that an investor places a large
order to purchase shares of XYZ on a day when no
public news about XYZ is released. Depending on
the characteristics of this trade, the price of XYZ
may change. For example, if market participants be-
lieve this trade was made by an investor who believes
the stock is undervalued, others may revise their own
expectations and afford shares of XYZ a higher price.
Alternatively, participants observing a large purchase
order may attribute the purchase to the fact that the
given purchaser of XYZ is a manager of an index fund
that is well known to have been receiving large inflows
of investment capital. Thus, the purchase of XYZ con-
tains no information about the value of XYZ shares.
In this case, one might expect the purchase to have
a more limited impact on the stock’s price. In reality,
the underlying purpose of individual trades is not gen-
erally known, and therefore one can characterize trades
as containing some degree of private information.
Understanding how both public and private types
of information influence security prices is one of the
main goals of financial market microstructure analysis.
Earnings announcements are perhaps the most visible
form of public information. At the most extreme, in-
sider trading by an executive knowing the contents
of a forthcoming news release is an example of private
information. However, private information can simply
be thought of as all information about a given securi-
ty price that is not known by all who trade it. For ex-
ample, a mutual fund manager’s decision to reduce40 1Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
the holding of a given stock would be considered pri-
vate information capable of affecting security prices.
Private information, however, can be even less
tangible. Differing opinions as to the implications of
an earnings announcement may generate important
private information, since some may believe the opti-
mal response to the news is to buy a security, whereas
others may wish to sell. It is the collective trades of
market participants that move prices. Market micro-
structure analysis presumes that trading is necessary
to determine prices because it conveys private infor-
mation regarding the value of the underlying asset.
The intuition is relatively simple: As a sequence of sell
orders arrives, prices will be adjusted lower as poten-
tial buyers incorporate a higher probability that better
informed traders believe the previous price was too high.
This article attempts to shed light on the relative
importance of private versus public information in
moving security prices. I examine closely the intraday
trading activity of ten large companies trading on the
New York Stock Exchange and estimate an empirical
model that relates trading activity to price changes. My
focus is on how this trading–price change relationship
changes on days when there is a major release of pub-
lic information regarding the company in question—
in particular, quarterly earnings announcements. In
this way, my goal is to quantify by how much, if any,
the trading–price change relationship changes with a
large increase in public information.
My hypothesis is that the strength of the trading–
price change relationship is a measure of the impor-
tance of private information in security price formation.
An empirical implication of this is that a major release
of news should be accompanied by a reduction in the
strength of the relationship between trading and price
changes. I conduct a series of empirical exercises that
provide evidence consistent with this hypothesis. How-
ever, my results further indicate that even after an
earnings announcement, private information plays a
significant role in security price determination. Across
the firms in my sample, I find that the strength of the
trading–price change relationship, my proxy for the
importance of private information, declines by no more
than one-third on trading days immediately follow-
ing a company’s quarterly earnings announcement.
Thus, private information appears to be a significant
factor in the relationship between trading and prices.
The remainder of this article is organized as fol-
lows. First, I briefly review some related work. Then,
I describe the data and the empirical framework of
my analysis. Finally, I present my findings and dis-
cuss their implications.
Related literature
As mentioned previously, market microstructure
theory argues that order flow (that is, the sequence of
buy and sell orders) affects prices because it conveys
private information regarding the value of the underly-
ing asset. In Glosten and Milgrom (1985), for example,
the authors formally model why private information
leads immediately to the presence of a bid–ask spread
(the difference between the proposed purchase price
and proposed sale price for the same security) as well
as a relationship between trading and price changes.
In their model, a marketmaker2 for a given security
stands ready to buy or sell. The marketmaker believes,
however, that some of the potential buyers have pri-
vate information that indicates that the marketmaker’s
current price of the security is too low. Alternatively,
or perhaps in addition, the marketmaker believes that
some potential sellers of the security have private in-
formation indicating the marketmaker’s price is too
high. The result of this asymmetry, along with the mar-
ketmaker’s continued willingness to trade, is a positive
bid–ask spread. That is, the price at which a market-
maker is willing to buy is lower than the price at which
he is willing to sell. This spread serves as compensa-
tion for trades made with those counterparties with
superior information.3 As a sequence of sell orders
arrive, marketmakers lower bid prices, incorporating
the probability that the order flow implies that better
informed investors believe the previous price was too
high. This adjustment of posted spreads implies an
analogous change in observed transaction prices.
Over the past two decades, the microstructure
literature has explored how, when, and how much
order flow affects stock prices. Here, I focus on the
work most related to my current analysis, specifically
work on the relationship between trading and price
changes.4 This relationship ultimately provides a(n
inverse) measure of a security’s liquidity because a
stock whose price changes a lot in response to in-
coming trades would be deemed relatively illiquid.
The literature shows that liquidity itself and the rela-
tionship between public news releases and liquidity
can be measured in a number of ways.
Seppi (1992) conducts empirical tests to determine
the informativeness of block trades (typically, 10,000
shares or more) and how this informativeness corre-
lates with public news releases. In particular, he docu-
ments that the prices at which such trades are filled
are positively correlated with the earnings surprises.
That is, block trades occur at higher prices before
positive earnings surprises and at lower prices before
negative earnings surprises. This is consistent with the
belief that investors making such trades, on average,41 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
have some knowledge about the information that will
be made public in a subsequent earnings announcement
and are therefore anticipating the change in stock price.
Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993) explicitly describe
various alternative measures of market liquidity. They
focus not only on the size of the bid–ask spread, but
also on a stock’s posted depth, which measures the
quantity of shares a marketmaker is willing to transact
at the posted bid and ask prices. Their study documents
that both spreads and depth adjust to the perceived
amount of private information in the market. In partic-
ular, spreads generally widen and depth generally falls
preceding earnings announcements.
Koski and Michaely (2000) extend these findings
by examining the relationship between measures of
liquidity (for example, spreads and depth) across key
information periods, which include both earnings and
dividend periods. They find that these liquidity mea-
sures do relate to the perceived information content
of the trade. In particular, large trades before dividend
announcement periods tend to reduce depth and in-
crease spreads most strongly. Similar results, though
smaller in magnitude, are found during announcement
periods. This is consistent with the notion that private
information is at its highest level just prior to a news
release. However, since these authors combined in-
formation from before and after an announcement pe-
riod, they could not distinguish precisely how news
affects liquidity over the period immediately preced-
ing and following announcements, nor did they for-
mally analyze the trading–price change relationship.
Green (2004) conducts a study of the relationship
between announcements and the information content
of trading in U.S. Treasury bonds. For Treasury bonds,
news announcements are not about corporate earnings,
but rather about the latest release of economic data.
Green finds that when macroeconomic news is released,
the information component of trading increases. Thus,
unlike Koski and Michaely (2000), Green associates
public news release with an increase in private infor-
mation. Perhaps macroeconomic news releases gen-
erate more information on which individual traders
can disagree, generating a higher share of private in-
formation that in turn affects security prices.
Thus, the previous empirical work provides evi-
dence that the more informative a given trade, the
greater its influence on security prices. However, the
evidence is somewhat mixed with regard to how the
overall liquidity of a security is influenced by news.
In particular, there is not yet a consensus as to whether
public news arrival reduces or generates private
information. Rather, it appears from previous work
that public news releases have the potential either to
generate or eliminate private information. Thus, it re-
mains an empirical question to decide whether public
news arrival will strengthen the trading–price change
relationship (consistent with private information gen-
eration) or weaken it (consistent with private infor-
mation elimination).
Data and empirical framework
My analysis relies on data from three sources.
I begin with the universe of firms whose earnings
history was available on Briefing.com. To select my
sample, I required that Briefing.com reported the
date, time, value, and market expectation of every
earnings announcement that a firm reported between
January 29, 2001, and December 31, 2004. For my
purposes, the Briefing.com data provide an important
piece of information unavailable in the more tradi-
tionally used sources of announcement histories, such
as Thomson Financial’s FirstCall and the Institutional
Brokers’ Estimate System: whether a firm’s earnings
announcement was made prior to the stock market
opening, during the trading day, or after the market
close. Thus, it is possible to know precisely which
day of stock market trading is associated with the re-
action to the earnings announcement. This distinction
will be crucial to my analysis. In what follows, I refer
to the first trading day following the announcement
as a company’s “announcement day.” For example,
if a company announces its earnings on a Tuesday
before or during trading hours, its announcement day
is that Tuesday. If the announcement is made on a
Tuesday after the market closes, its announcement
day will be that Wednesday. Furthermore, my analysis
carefully considered the role of weekends and public
holidays in order to correctly pair a given announce-
ment with the next possible trading day.
I then compared this sample of firms to the data-
base provided by the Center for Research in Security
Prices. I considered only those firms that were listed
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to avoid
the well-known differences in the liquidity (and by
extension, the strength of the trading–price change
relationship) of stocks trading on different exchang-
es. I then calculated each firm’s market capitalization
based on stock price data as of December 31, 2001,
and selected the ten largest remaining firms to be the
focus of my study.
Having identified the ten stocks in my sample,
I then combined the earnings announcement informa-
tion from Briefing.com with high frequency data on
the trading of the stocks of these ten firms from the
NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. Although
Briefing.com provides earnings information since42 1Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
1997, I restrict my sample period to January 29, 2001,
through December 31, 2004. The starting date of my
sample corresponds to the first day on which all stocks
listed on the NYSE began trading with a minimum
price increment (tick) of one cent (that is, decimal-
ization). This eliminates the need to consider how
minimum tick size changes might influence the rela-
tionship between earnings announcements and liquidity,
since a vast literature has documented the importance
of minimum tick size to liquidity in general.
I then adjusted the data according to procedures
common in the microstructure literature. I dropped
quotes with obviously erroneous data (for example,
quotes with bid or ask prices equal to zero or quotes
with bid–ask spreads dramatically different from the
previous or subsequent quote). Following Hasbrouck
(1991), I kept only quotes originating from the NYSE
and considered multiple trades on a regional exchange
for the same stock at the same price and time as one
trade. Then, I sorted the trade data (for each compa-
ny and day) by time, with the prevailing quote at
transaction t defined as the last quote that was posted
at least five seconds before the transaction (Lee and
Ready, 1991). I provide a complete listing of the
stocks in my sample, along with summary statistics
on their trading, in table 1.
The summary statistics show many facts about
stock market trading. First, these ten stocks are very
heavily traded. The least actively traded stock in my
sample is Coca-Cola (KO), yet shares of this stock
traded over 3,800 times each day, a trading intensity
of roughly once every six seconds. The most actively
traded stock in my sample is  General Electric (GE),
whose shares traded over 11,000 times each day on
average (approximately once every two seconds).
Bid–ask spreads on all of the sample stocks are typi-
cally quite narrow. On average, spreads range from a
low of 1.82 cents for Nortel (NT) to a high of 5.23
cents for IBM.
I am interested in changes in trading characteris-
tics that occur on or around earnings announcement
days. To present some preliminary evidence on this
TABLE 1
Summary statistics
Average trade Average number Average bid–ask Average depth,
Name/Ticker size, shares of trades spread, dollars  round lots
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (BMY) 1,537.9490 4,175.6380 0.0334 31.6022
(527.6960) (1,326.6590) (0.0238) (14.9068)
EMC Corp. (EMC) 2,343.7580 7,070.8470 0.0331 79.0106
(655.9954) (2,606.1300) (0.0375) (36.9236)
General Electric Co. (GE) 2,040.1440 11,271.3300 0.0271 68.7537
(703.1345) (3,437.3040) (0.0156) (40.4598)
Home Depot Inc. (HD) 1,339.4020 6,446.9410 0.0304 36.5258
(339.1715) (2,160.3100) (0.0178) (20.9643)
International Business Machines
  Corp. (IBM) 1,100.4560 6,776.2480 0.0523 16.3487
(384.0330) (1,680.0090) (0.0302) (8.0540)
Coca-Cola Co. (KO) 1,415.3070 3,827.4650 0.0290 23.3063
(473.8881) (1,321.2770) (0.0149) (10.2120)
Merck & Co. Inc. (MRK) 1,403.8030 5,421.9910 0.0382 26.9202
(448.6887) (3,776.4130) (0.0258) (22.3486)
Nortel Networks Corp. (NT) 4,906.4550 5,451.2300 0.0182 720.4567
(3099.6320) (3,899.5310) (0.0170) (730.3201)
Pfizer Inc. (PFE) 1,982.2700 8,839.0240 0.0270 55.0667
(465.7550) (3,908.9970) (0.0152) (38.1269)
SBC Communications Inc. (SBC) 1,784.0950 4,608.6720 0.0282 40.3322
(516.5796) (1,219.6850) (0.0162) (19.2419)
Notes: This table reports the mean (and standard deviation in parentheses) of various measures of trading activity for each
stock in the sample. Averages are taken across all 959 days that are not within one day of an earnings announcement.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from Briefing.com and the New York Stock Exchange Trade and Quote database.43 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
subject, I regress the daily values of various measures
of trading activity on a set of dummy variables that
indicate the day before, the day of, and the day after
an earnings announcement. Coefficients from this re-
gression, which represent differences relative to all
other days, are presented in table 2. This table indicates
that there are noticeable changes in common proxies
for stock market liquidity on earnings announcement
days. Most strikingly, trading volume increases. Trade
size and average depth, which represents the number
of shares available at the posted spread, also tend to
rise on announcement days, although these results
appear to be statistically significant for only a subset
of my sample firms. For KO shares, for example, aver-
age trade size increases by 587 shares, and typical depth
rises by 7.4 round lots (that is, 740 shares) on announce-
ment days. Not all statistical indicators of liquidity,
however, indicate greater liquidity on announcement
days. Although not statistically significant in most cases,
bid–ask spreads tend to rise on announcement days. For
instance, IBM’s bid–ask spread typically increases by
1.4 cents on an announcement day. Data across these
ten stocks tell a similarly inconsistent story with re-
gard to the relationship between liquidity and an-
nouncement days—namely, that announcement days
witness an increase in trading volume and depth, but
either little change or a widening of bid–ask spreads.
Because announcement days are correlated with
heavier trading volume and higher depth but wider
spreads, it would be useful to focus on a measure of
stock market liquidity that may account for these
changes. Here, I use the price impact of a trade as a
measure of a stock’s liquidity that embeds the impact
of volume, spreads, and depth. That is, I take the po-
sition that price impact is the quantity that ultimately
relates to the strength of the trading–price change re-
lationship and that volume, spreads, and depth (among
other observable characteristics) are noisy indicators
of such a relationship.
I adopt the general empirical framework of
Hasbrouck (1991), who estimates a vector autoregres-
sion (VAR) model of two equations. The first equa-
tion models trade-to-trade stock returns as a function
of past returns as well as current and past trades, ex-
plicitly considering whether the trade was to purchase
or to sell shares. The second equation models the de-
cision to buy or sell as a function of both past trading
and past stock returns. In such a framework, Hasbrouck
delivered some benchmark results upon which I build
in my analysis. In particular, Hasbrouck documents the
positive relationship between order flow and price changes
using a sample of 80 NYSE and American Stock and
Options Exchange (AMEX) stocks. That is, buy orders
lead to price increases, and sell orders lead to price de-
clines. Hasbrouck further extended his analysis to in-
dicate that larger trades tend to move prices more, a
finding that I incorporate into my framework.
My empirical results are based upon VAR models
of increasing complexity. The first merely replicates
a version of the Hasbrouck (1991) analysis. I specify
this by equations 1 and 2, which I estimate separately
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The unit of observation is the trade, which is in-
dexed by the subscript t. The variable rt is defined as
the change in the natural logarithm of the midquote
(average of the current bid and ask price) of a given
stock that follows the trade at time t. I use midquotes
as my price variable to eliminate the well-known
problems with using actual transaction prices in em-
pirical analysis, notably the tendency of transaction
prices to bounce between the bid and ask prices with-
out indicating any true movement in the underlying
security value. Also following Hasbrouck (1991),
I define xt as the log of the number of shares of trade
t, signed to indicate whether or not trade t was initiated
by a buy order or a sell order. That is, a positive value
of xt indicates a buyer-initiated trade, and a negative
value indicates a seller-initiated trade. As the TAQ
data do not indicate which party initiated each trade,
I follow the literature’s convention and assume that
trades at a transaction price greater than the midquote
were buyer-initiated and trades below the midquote
were seller-initiated. For trades at the midquote, I de-
termine the side of trade origination according to the
tick rule (see Lee and Ready, 1991).
I truncate the VAR model by setting L equal to
eight for all stocks and for all time periods. Though
longer than the five lags adopted by Hasbrouck (1991),
this reflects the higher level of trading in more recent
periods. Finally, I estimate equations 1 and 2 by ordi-
nary least squares and correct standard errors using
White’s (1980) methodology.
I then expand the model in several ways to ex-
plore how the relationship between trading and price
might change in ways related to earnings announce-
ments. My first additional model can be expressed by
equations 3 and 4.44 1Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
TABLE 2
Deviations around announcement dates
Average trade Average number Average bid–ask Average depth,
Name/Ticker size, shares of trades spread, dollars  round lots
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (BMY)
Day before announcement 72.634 28.562 –0.005 –3.274
(105.172) (257.771) (0.004) (2.716)
Day of announcement 565.982 1,484.962 0.003 4.404
(144.990)** (527.086)** (0.004) (3.835)
Day after announcement 266.810 615.362 –0.000 –0.466
(155.257) (296.985)* (0.005) (2.896)
EMC Corp. (EMC)
Day before announcement 243.296 668.353 –0.002 9.878
(158.294) (840.003) (0.010) (10.834)
Day of announcement 735.740 2,981.953 0.003 40.342
(176.647)** (947.399)** (0.009) (11.384)**
Day after announcement 353.466 476.953 –0.003 15.625
(158.172)* (614.181) (0.009) (8.527)
General Electric Co. (GE)
Day before announcement 97.373 1,056.405 0.000 –0.966
(133.625) (1,076.020) (0.003) (4.692)
Day of announcement 129.556 4,079.672 0.001 12.941
(100.314) (1,441.108)** (0.003) (10.381)
Day after announcement –192.732 1,288.405 –0.001 –0.772
(102.162) (1,190.934) (0.003) (7.713)
Home Depot Inc. (HD)
Day before announcement 48.028 1,261.246 –0.001 0.163
(70.942) (720.627) (0.003) (3.166)
Day of announcement 375.450 4,809.309 0.013 18.399
(86.186)** (1,315.088)** (0.005)** (6.817)**
Day after announcement 219.703 2,343.559 –0.000 6.231
(96.178)* (913.464)* (0.003) (3.282)
International Business Machines
Corp. (IBM)
Day before announcement 170.724 1,727.752 0.004 1.907
(104.526) (380.877)** (0.008) (1.826)
Day of announcement 626.777 2,918.418 0.014 3.711
(117.181)** (509.751)** (0.006)* (1.689)*
Day after announcement 213.212 596.018 –0.004 1.969
(98.206)* (349.537) (0.005) (1.967)
Coca-Cola Co. (KO)
Day before announcement 78.408 –48.028 –0.000 1.610
(74.701) (274.959) (0.003) (1.895)
Day of announcement 587.421 1,125.597 0.008 7.404
(104.822)** (584.509) (0.004) (3.442)*
Day after announcement 431.017 202.347 0.003 1.503
(157.521)** (365.853) (0.003) (1.675)45 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 2 (CONT.)
Deviations around announcement dates
Average trade Average number Average bid–ask Average depth,
Name/Ticker size, shares of trades spread, dollars  round lots
Merck & Co. Inc. (MRK)
Day before announcement 175.166 –312.124 –0.003 2.818
(103.951) (566.237) (0.005) (6.171)
Day of announcement 368.051 769.009 0.009 3.516
(179.600)* (743.123) (0.010) (4.235)
Day after announcement 141.529 521.743 –0.003 0.014
(112.102) (610.989) (0.004) (3.631)
Nortel Networks Corp. (NT)
Day before announcement 820.685 518.699 –0.002 339.403
(767.880) (943.700) (0.002) (347.604)
Day of announcement 4,894.836 2,287.913 –0.001 377.644
(3,370.319) (1,918.236) (0.002) (314.681)
Day after announcement 514.354 570.556 –0.003 80.856
(698.632) (1,366.929) (0.002) (214.662)
Pfizer Inc. (PFE)
Day before announcement –143.558 154.976 –0.003 –6.791
(58.216)* (531.356) (0.002) (5.924)
Day of announcement 357.292 2,769.176 0.001 21.312
(219.192) (1,017.787)** (0.003) (16.608)
Day after announcement 198.882 1,007.643 –0.003 9.601
(156.403) (581.881) (0.002) (13.909)
SBC Communications Inc. (SBC)
Day before announcement 315.454 358.595 –0.001 5.006
(141.799)* (350.205) (0.003) (7.154)
Day of announcement 751.766 1,028.662 0.002 9.746
(109.573)** (432.073)* (0.003) (6.838)
Day after announcement 533.909 682.195 –0.000 6.627
(146.305)** (350.751) (0.003) (4.980)
*Significant at the 5 percent level.
**Significant at the 1 percent level.
Note: This table reports the coefficient estimates (and the Newey-West standard errors in parentheses) of a regression of average daily
values of each stock on the days surrounding an announcement date.
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In this empirical specification, I add terms to the
model that interact the trade size variable xt with a
dummy variable at, which is set equal to one if trade t
occurs on an announcement date. This allows the rela-
tionship between trading and price changes to be dif-
ferent on announcement days. For example, positive
estimated values for θ would indicate that the rela-
tionship between trading and stock returns becomes
stronger on announcement days.
Because I have identified a positive relationship
between trading volume and announcement days, it
is important to confirm that any relationship I find be-
tween announcement days and price impact when I
estimate equations 3 and 4 is due to the announcement
and not simply an artifact of higher trading volume.
To this end, I next estimate an expanded version of
equations 3 and 4, where I interact the trade indicator
variable with a variable lt, measuring trading volume
on the day on which trade t occurs. This expanded
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My next empirical specification extends the model
described by equations 5 and 6 to explore whether days
immediately surrounding announcement days may be
noticeably different than other days. As described in
equations 7 and 8, I do this by interacting variables bt,
defined to equal one if trade t occurs on the day be-
fore an announcement date and zero otherwise, and
ft, defined analogously for the day after an announce-
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 I estimate the empirical model described by equa-
tions 7 and 8 to explore whether the private information
content of a trade varies according to the proximity
to a public announcement rather than only depending
on whether the announcement was just made. For ex-
ample, one might believe that if announcement days
reduce the private information content of stock trading,
then the day before such an announcement might be
expected to contain a higher than average amount of
private information. That is, the likelihood of a trader’s
having private information regarding a future earnings
announcement might be expected to be the greatest
immediately before the announcement. If this were
the case, one might expect that the λi coefficients
would be greater than zero. As for the day following
the announcement, allowing the relationship between
trading and stock returns to differ facilitates an explora-
tion as to whether any changes detected on the announce-
ment day persist until the following day. To the extent
that there is persistence, one might expect to estimate
values for θi very close to the values estimated for φi.
Much like equations 7 and 8, my final empirical
specification extends the model described by 5 and 6.
However, rather than exploring whether the relationship
between trading and returns varies according to the
proximity in calendar time from the announcement
date, I instead explore whether the importance of the
announcement date varies according to the realized con-
tent of the given announcement. That is, I wish to dis-
tinguish between announcements that contain surprising
information and those that do not. In particular, I es-
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Here, I define st as an indicator variable that is equal
to one when the actual earnings announced differed
from expected earnings as reported by Briefing.com
by more than $0.01 per share.5 One hypothesis is that
surprising earnings releases reveal more private infor-
mation than those that are unsurprising. If this were
true, one would expect the coefficients βi to be negative.
Empirical results
I form my estimate of the price impact of a trade
by calculating the cumulative impulse response of a
shock to xt on stock returns rt. As a point of departure,
figure 1 graphs these responses for each firm, when
the size of the shock xt is set equal to each stock’s
median trade size and also to the stock’s 90th percen-
tile trade size. This allows one to judge the overall
liquidity of a stock on average across the roughly
four years of data and to measure by how much more
a large trade moves prices than a more typical trade.
For example, panel A of figure 1 depicts the impulse
response functions for Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (BMY).
The graph shows that a median-sized buy order is es-
timated to eventually raise the price of BMY shares
by approximately 1.4 basis points. A large trade that
was unexpected is estimated to have a long-run im-
pact of increasing BMY share prices by a little over
1.8 basis points. The main findings illustrated by
figure 1 are that even across a sample of large firms,
market liquidity varies across firms and across trades
of a given firm. For instance, across these ten stocks,
a median-sized trade is estimated to raise prices by
between 0.7 and 1.9 basis points, depending on the47 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
The long-run price impact of median- and large-sized trades
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stock. Furthermore, for every stock in the sample, larger
trades appear to have a greater price impact.
As illustrated in figure 1, the cumulative impulse
response of a trade shock on stock returns generally
begins with a rapid increase immediately following
the shock and then levels off at a point higher than its
initial value. As I extend the initial model to account
for announcement days, this shape remains. Because
of this, I choose to present the remaining results by
reporting values based on the “long-run” impulse re-
sponse, which is derived from the cumulative im-
pulse response function by reading off the final value
calculated—in this case, the value of the cumulative
shock to returns seen 16 trades after the initial shock.
Note that this long run typically takes less than a
minute. To illustrate, figure 2 reports the cumulative
long-run impulse responses on returns of a trade
shock for each of the ten stocks in my sample after
I estimate equations 3 and 4, which extend the previ-
ous model by allowing the price impact of a trade to
vary according to whether the given trade occurs on
a day with an earnings announcement. Each panel of
figure 2 reports two values. The first bar reports the
long-run price impact of a median-sized trade on a
nonannouncement day (that is, normal day). The sec-
ond bar reports the long-run cumulative value of the
same sized trade on an announcement date.
Qualitatively, the results are similar across all ten
firms in the sample. In particular, the price impact of
a median-sized trade is uniformly lower on an announce-
ment day than on other days during the sample period.
This result is consistent with the notion that price im-
pact is partially explained by marketmakers defend-
ing themselves against asymmetric information. In other
words, prices move in response to trades because
marketmakers believe some traders have private in-
formation. Furthermore, this private information is
reduced when a public earnings announcement is re-
leased. The magnitude of the reduction in price im-
pact varies across the ten firms. In the case of BMY,
the reduction in price impact is rather small. My model
estimates that the long-run price impact of a trade de-
clines from approximately 1.42 basis points to 1.39
basis points, a reduction of only 2.1 percent. For other
companies, the reduction in price impact on announce-
ment days is far more pronounced. The impact of a
median-sized trade of Home Depot (HD) stock is rough-
ly 1.2 basis points on nonannouncement days, but
only 0.8 basis points on announcement days. This
represents a reduction in price impact of 33 percent.
The results of figure 2 show that announcement
days witness a decline in the price impact of trading,
suggesting that the release of public information does
reduce the private information embedded in a trade.
I reached this conclusion by estimating a model that
allowed the relationship between trading and returns
to vary according to whether a given trade occurred
on an announcement day. As mentioned previously,
it is important to attribute the lower price impact of
a trade on announcement days to the announcement
and not to the typically higher trading volume wit-
nessed on announcement days. Figure 3 reports the
analogous results to those of figure 2, only with the
long-run price impact measures being derived from
an estimation of equations 5 and 6, which control for
daily trading volume.6 As shown in figure 3, for nine
out of ten stocks, announcement days remain corre-
lated with a reduction in the long-run price impact of
a trade. Moreover, the one stock for which this result
is not found is BMY, which had a negligible decline
in price impact when I did not control for trading
volume. The magnitude of the decline is also largely
comparable to what was reported in figure 2. The im-
pact of a median-sized trade of Home Depot (HD) stock
on a day with typical trading volume, for example, is
estimated to be 0.93 basis points on nonannouncement
days, but only 0.62 basis points on announcement
days. This represents the same 33 percent reduction
in price impact for HD that was reported in figure 2.
Next, I analyze my extensions to this basic
framework. One extension is to explore whether the
private information that does get released in an earn-
ings announcement may partially “leak” to the public
before the official release or, alternatively, whether
the private information is at a maximum before the
release. A related question is how the private informa-
tion component of price impact varies after the an-
nouncement date. For example, does the relationship
between trading and returns immediately revert to a
more normal level or does price impact remain at a low-
er level for some time following the earnings release?
Figure 4 (p. 51) addresses these questions by
reporting the cumulative long-run price impact for a
median-sized trade, calculated from an analysis using
equations 7 and 8. Recall that in this model specifica-
tion, the relationship between trading and returns is
allowed to vary not only  on an announcement day,
but also on the day before and the day after an an-
nouncement. To illustrate the information contained
in figure 4, I highlight the results for shares of Nortel
Networks Corp. (NT). The first bar in panel H reports
that the cumulative long-run impact of a median-sized
trade of NT stock is 1.6 basis points on a day not in
proximity to an earnings announcement. The second
through fourth bars calculate the same quantity only
on the day of, the day before, and the day after an49 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIGURE 2
The long-run price impact of a trade on normal days and announcement days
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FIGURE 3
The long-run price impact of a trade on normal days and announcement days,
controlling for changes in trading volume
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FIGURE 4
The long-run price impact of a trade before, during, and after announcements,
controlling for changes in trading volume
A. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (BMY)
basis points
B. EMC Corp. (EMC)
basis points
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from Briefing.com and the New York Stock Exchange Trade and Quote database.
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earnings announcement. As reported in the second
bar, the price impact of a trade of NT falls to around
1.3 basis points on an announcement day. However,
the figure also indicates that the price impact remains
near this lower level on the following day. On the
day before the announcement, however, the price im-
pact of an NT trade is higher than is typical, measur-
ing approximately 1.8 basis points.
This pattern is consistent with the following sto-
ry of the private information content of price impact.
Suppose that every day new information about the value
of NT shares is generated, but initially, this new informa-
tion is private. Suppose further that none of this private
information is released until the day of the announce-
ment. In this scenario, one expects that the amount of
private information is greatest just before the announce-
ment. According to microstructure theory, this would
then cause the price impact of a trade to be greatest just
before an announcement and to fall after an announce-
ment. This story is therefore consistent with the esti-
mated price impact of NT trading around announcement
dates. Four of the ten sample stocks, however, are es-
timated to have a greater price impact on the day be-
fore an earnings announcement, and so this story is
potentially an explanation for only some firms.
Consider a different case such as the one illustrated
by the results for trading of IBM stock. The long-run
price impact of a trade of IBM is lower on days im-
mediately before and immediately after an earnings
announcement than it is on other days. Five of the ten
stocks match this pattern. If private information was
the source of the change in price impact, then these re-
sults suggest that private information is reduced before
the announcement date. This would be consistent with
a potential information leak or perhaps with informa-
tion being intentionally released by the company prior
to its formal quarter earnings release.
One final issue I explore is whether the reduction
in price impact observed on announcement days is
related to what news is actually released in the announce-
ment. For example, an earnings release that is in line
with market expectations may not reduce private in-
formation very much, since even in the absence of a
formal announcement, market participants seemed
quite knowledgeable about the announcement’s contents.
A surprising announcement, however, may reveal a
greater amount of private information. An alternative
hypothesis is that a surprising announcement may gen-
erate more private information because there may be
more differences in opinion as to the implication of an
earnings surprise on the fundamental value of the stock.
I explore the relationship between price impact and
announcement content by estimating equations 9 and
10, which allow the trading and return relationship to
vary according to whether a trade occurs on an an-
nouncement date and whether the given announcement
is surprising. I define a surprising announcement as
one in which the market’s expected earnings were
more than $0.01 per share away from the actual re-
ported value. For nine of the ten firms in the sample,
this identified roughly half of all announcements as
surprises. The tenth firm, General Electric Co. (GE),
did not have a surprising announcement over the en-
tire sample period, with earnings never being more
than a penny away from the market’s expectation.
For this reason, I do not include GE in this final
empirical estimation.
Figure 5 presents the long-run price impact of a
median-sized trade of each of the remaining nine com-
panies. As is illustrated in the figure, there does not
appear to be a general relationship between private
information content and announcement surprise con-
tent. In particular, a trade of six of the nine stocks is
associated with a lower price impact when the announce-
ment is more surprising relative to when it is not. For
instance, a median-sized trade of Pfizer Inc. (PFE)
stock typically moves the price by 0.66 basis points.
On a day when an unsurprising announcement is made,
price impact falls to 0.62 basis points. On a day when
the earnings announcement is also more than a penny
away from the market’s expectation, price impact falls
by even more, to 0.51 basis points. The evidence from
the remaining three stocks indicates the opposite re-
lationship between announcement content and price
impact reduction. For instance, a trade in the stock of
SBC Communications Inc. (SBC) typically moves
the share price by 1.23 basis points. This falls to 1.14
basis points on an announcement day without an earn-
ings surprise, but falls by less than 0.01 basis points
on announcement days when earnings miss expecta-
tions by more than $0.01.
Conclusion
In this article, I examine how the price impact of
a trade varies throughout the days surrounding public
earnings announcements. My results indicate that pub-
lic news releases correlate with a reduction in the price
impact of a trade. This finding is consistent with
earnings releases generally reducing the asymmetric
information component of stock trading. Moreover,
this result is robust to the typical increase in trading
volume generally observed on such days. Extending
the sample beyond a focus on the announcement day
alone, however, fails to uncover systematic relation-
ships on either the day before or the day after earnings
announcements. In particular, the reduction in price53 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIGURE 5
The long-run price impact of a trade for surprising and unsurprising announcements,
controlling for changes in trading volume
A. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (BMY)
basis points
B. EMC Corp. (EMC)
basis points
Notes: Results for General Electric Co. (GE) are not applicable. See the text for further details.
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impact on announcement days does not typically per-
sist beyond one trading day, nor do markets seem to
contain higher than average levels of asymmetric in-
formation on the day prior to anticipated announcements.
Perhaps most surprisingly, I do not find a predictable
relationship between the change in price impact and
1More generally, the price of a share of stock should equal the present
value of future dividends discounted at a rate commensurate with
the risk of the given payment stream, where risk is measured by an
asset pricing model. Thus, expectations about both future dividends
and future risk are relevant in determining current market prices.
2A marketmaker is an individual or firm authorized by the stock
exchange to buy and sell a particular security with an objective to
provide trading liquidity for the security. Generally, a marketmaker
is obliged to announce buying and selling prices for a particular
security at a particular time.
3An implication of this model is that traders lacking private infor-
mation face higher trading costs in that they must compensate the
marketmaker for being willing to transact at posted prices in the
presence of those with more information.
4Readers who are more interested may wish to begin a more in-
depth review of market microstructure analysis by reading Biais,
Glosten, and Spatt (2005).
5Briefing.com reports earnings expectations from Zacks Invest-
ment Research and from Reuters. As it is more complete, I choose
the expectation reported by Zacks, but use Reuters data when
Zacks data are missing.
6For these calculations, trading volume is set to a stock’s median
(across days in the sample) daily trading volume. Regression re-
sults indicate a strong negative relationship between trading vol-
ume and price impact. That is, days with higher trading volume
are associated with lower price impact of a single trade.
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the information content of the announcement. For some
firms, surprising announcements tend to increase asym-
metric information and price impact relative to unsur-
prising announcements, whereas for other firms the
reverse is true.